Military and Strategic Journal
Issued by the Directorate of Morale Guidance at the General Command of the Armed Forces
United Arab Emirates
Founded in August 1971

2017-07-10

Hybrid Warfare and its Implications for the Region

A new form of conflict, labeled as hybrid warfare, has become a “buzzword” that hardly any security conference or journal passes by without mentioning it. While the term – hybrid warfare - lacks a clear definition, it has gained more traction since the Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
 
By:Grigol Mgaloblishvili
Acting Dean, UAE NDC
 
Hybrid warfare is largely associated with both Iran and Russia’s use of subversive instruments to advance their strategic objectives. Iran’s ability to employ a wide range of military and non-military instruments to undermine its competitors significantly alters the security landscape of the Middle East.
 
Alongside the changing security landscape in the region, hybrid warfare raises concerns about the ability of regional states to counter the evolving character of hybrid threats. Given the significant implications over regional security, there are several questions that are relevant for further consideration: How can hybrid warfare be defined? What are its characteristics? And, how does it impact the UAE’s national security? Answering these questions is instrumental not only for analyzing this concept but also for finding the ways to counter this phenomenon. 
 
There is no universally accepted definition of hybrid warfare. The problem of defining hybrid warfare lies in associating the changing character of war with different military instruments and disregarding the emerging importance of non-military means. As Frank Hoffman rightly points out, “The problem with the hybrid threat definition is that it focuses on combinations of tactics associated with violence and warfare (except for criminal acts) but completely fails to capture other non-violent actions.”

Characterizing hybrid warfare as a combination of regular and irregular means, covert and overt actions, and traditional and non-traditional security threats misses an important aspect. Namely, it neglects one of the most important aspects of hybrid warfare – weaponization of non-military means. Hybrid warfare is a modern form of conflict that puts emphasis on weaponization of non-military means to undermine and delegitimize an adversary. What the French levee en masse or conscription was to warfare at the end of the 18th century, the weaponization of non-military means is to warfare in today.

It is a warfare that primarily focuses on attaining strategic objectives without resorting to physical conflict, especially, in the initial stages of the conflict. The frequently cited article of the Russian Chief of Staff General Gerasimov, published on 27 February 2013 in a fairly obscure magazine “Military-Industrial Courier” lays the ground for better understanding this phenomenon.

As General Gerasimov highlights – “The emphasis in methods of struggle is shifting toward widespread use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures, implemented through the involvement of the population …overt use of force, often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis management, occurs only at a certain stage, primarily to achieve definitive success in the conflict.” General Gerasimov’s words clearly lay down the essence of the evolving character of warfare.

Namely, in modern-day conflict strategic objectives are achieved not necessarily with the use of hard power instruments but rather with the application of political, economic, informational, and other non-military measures exercised in close coordination with the protest potential of the population. 
 
There are at least four main characteristics of hybrid warfare:
First, it is persistent. Hybrid warfare is characterized by deliberately blurring the lines between the state of war and state of peace. Modern-day conflicts start way before the first bullets are fired. Hybrid means of contemporary conflict are “designed to cripple a state before that state even realizes conflict has begun.

” Obscuring the borders between war and peace allows belligerent actors to economize use of force and to “subvert and destroy states without direct, overt and large-scale military intervention.” It also enables belligerent actors to run a campaign of plausible deniability, designed to disguise the extent of their military engagement.
 
Second, hybrid warfare is characterized by the increasing importance of non-military means in achieving strategic objectives. In a modern-day conflict undermining the foundation of an adversary or competitor’s statehood is more important than a military victory over an opponent.

According to Chinese classic strategist Sun Tzu, this would be an aspect of winning the battle before the battle is fought. In this regard “the role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.

” Thus, in modern-day conflict we clearly observe a tendency of increasing reliance on non-military instruments of national power to attain strategic objectives. 
 
Third, hybrid warfare is characterized by increasing the importance of indirect war fighting strategies, whether this is reliance on proxies or application of military means of a concealed nature. The reliance on proxies and insignia-less forces in military operations enables belligerent actors to achieve at least two strategic objectives: first, to disguise and deny the extent of their military engagement and second, to present ongoing military confrontation as intra-state rather than inter-state conflict.
 
And finally, hybrid warfare is population-centric. Influencing the population of a targeted country through information operations, proxy groups or other subversive instruments have become a key aspect of a modern-day conflict.

It enables belligerent actors to work within social and political frameworks of targeted countries and undermine the fundamentals of their statehood without resorting to full scale, overt military operations.
 
The relevance of hybrid warfare for the UAE goes beyond theoretical debate on the changing character of conflict and has practical implications for its security.

Iran’s ability to synchronize all instruments of national power and to use them as subversive tools to advance its strategic objectives could change the existing power-balance and security landscape of the region. Tehran’s aptness to use proxies and military of concealed nature have played an important role in augmenting the latter’s influence in the “wider” Middle East.

To a certain extent “it can be argued that Iran blazed the trail for Moscow in revealing how ‘little green men’ could be used as effective political-military tools against their respective neighbors.” Moreover, Iran’s strategy of using the weaknesses of existing social and political systems in the targeted countries and its ability to influence populations of the neighboring states through application of variety non-military means has played a key role in significantly enhancing its influence over the region.

Countries such as Iran that invest in the crises of others through non-military means may have a decisive advantage in future conflicts in the region. These factors can significantly increase the relevance and importance of studying the lessons of hybrid warfare for the regional states in general, and UAE in particular. 
 
Credit:NDC Magazine June 2017
 

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