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2016-10-06
Countering Ballistic Missiles: The Significance of Missile Defense
Missile defense proves crucial for defending critical nodes, military assets, and seats of government
An increase of over 1,400 additional ballistic missiles over the past 5 years is due to countries considering them as a means to project power in regional and strategic contexts, and a capability to launch an attack from a distance.
The total number of ballistic missiles outside the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Russia, and China has risen over 5,900. Hundreds of launchers and missiles are currently within the range of most nations.
According to the United States Intelligence Community, current trends indicate that proliferation of ballistic missile systems, using advanced liquid- or solid-propellant propulsion technologies, are becoming more mobile, survivable, reliable, accurate and capable of striking targets over longer distances.
The proliferation of ballistic missiles is also increasing the number of anti-access weapons available to potential regional adversaries. These weapons could be used to reduce military options for Combatant Commanders and decrease the survivability of regional military assets.
Potential threats
Presently, sophisticated ballistic missile technology is available on a wider scale than ever to countries hostile to the US and allies. As those countries continue to develop and exchange this technology, there is also an increasing threat of those technologies falling into the hands of hostile non-state groups.
One example is Iran, which could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States. Since 2008, Iran has conducted multiple successful launches of the two-stage Safir space launch vehicle (SLV) and has also revealed the larger two-stage Simorgh SLV, which could serve as a test bed for developing ICBM technologies. Since 2010, Iran has revealed the Qiam-1 SRBM, the fourth generation Fateh-110 SRBM, and claims to be mass-producing antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). Iran has modified its Shahab 3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) to extend its range and effectiveness and also claims to have deployed the two-stage, solid-propellant Sejjil MRBM.
Further afield, North Korea has unveiled the new road-mobile Hwasong-13 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) while continuing to develop the Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2), which placed a satellite in orbit for the first time in December 2012. An intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and a new solidpropellant short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) are also being developed. Last month’s nuclear test was North Korea’s second this year, something that shows North Korea is “mastering the technology.” However, analysts say there is no way to determine the extent of North Korea’s missile technology until they actually use it.
An additional concern are North Korea’s and Iran’s repeated demonstrations of salvo launches, indicating large ballistic missile attack raid sizes must be considered in developing the Ballistic Missile Defense System capability.
Syria continues to field updated Short-Range Ballistic Missile systems and acquire Scud-related equipment and materials from North Korea and Iran.
Countering the Threat - The Role of Interceptors
Missile defenses - defined as a system, weapon, or technology involved in the detection, tracking, interception, and destruction of attacking missiles - can provide a permanent presence in a region and discourage adversaries from believing they can use ballistic missiles to coerce or intimidate the US or its allies.
The United States and its allies use overlapping layers of long-range, mid-range and short-range interceptors to shoot down missiles and incoming warheads at a variety of altitudes.
The best defensive strategy against all standoff missiles, be they ballistic or cruise missile class weapons, is to pre-emptively attack and destroy the launch platform. This was true in 1944 when the first V-1 and V-2 weapons were deployed and remains true today – ‘killing the archer rather than the arrow’.
This is, unfortunately, easier said than done, and counterforce air strikes against mobile missile launchers have been bedevilled with targeting problems since 1944 – the US Air Force effort against Saddam’s Scud force in 1991 represents the most recent example. With ballistic and cruise missiles more recently deployed on submarines and surface warships, the problem gains a further dimension.
Ground based mobile launchers, however, represent the greatest difficulty, as these are highly mobile and easily concealed. Users favour the ‘shoot and scoot’ strategy, and tracking weapons post launch leaves a very narrow time window to locate and kill the launcher before it departs.
Interception of both cruise missiles and ballistic missiles in flight is challenging, and it is an open question as to which is the more difficult target.
Ballistic missiles are characteristically easy to detect and track once launched, but their hypersonic terminal phase velocity represents a real problem for defensive weapon systems. The problem is often described as ‘hitting a bullet with another bullet’, and the problem increases in difficulty as the range of the missile and its terminal velocity increase. Killing a Scud B is easier than killing an IRBM, and killing an IRBM in turn is easier than killing an ICBM.
Missile defense technology being developed, tested and deployed by the United States is designed to counter ballistic missiles of all ranges—short, medium, intermediate and long. Since ballistic missiles have different ranges, speeds, size and performance characteristics, the Ballistic Missile Defense System is an integrated, “layered” architecture that provides multiple opportunities to destroy missiles and their warheads before they can reach their targets. The system’s architecture includes:
• networked sensors, including space-based and ground- and sea-based radars for target detection and tracking;
• ground- and sea-based interceptor missiles for destroying a ballistic missile using either the force of a direct collision, called “hit-to-kill” technology, or an explosive blast fragmentation warhead;
• and a command, control, battle management, and communications network providing the operational commanders with the needed links between the sensors and interceptor missiles.
Trajectory path
Ballistic missiles follow a four-phased trajectory path: boost, ascent, midcourse, and terminal.
Boost Phase
The boost phase defenses can defeat ballistic missiles of all ranges, including Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), but it is the most difficult phase in which to engage a missile. The intercept “window” is only from one to five minutes. Although the missile is easiest to detect and track in the boost phase because its exhaust is bright and hot, missile defense interceptors and sensors must be in close proximity to the missile launch. Early detection in the boost phase allows for a rapid response and intercept early in its flight, possibly before any countermeasures can be deployed. Much of the justification for the design of the stealthy Northrop B-2A Spirit bomber was the hunting of highly mobile Soviet ICBM launchers.
Midcourse Phase
Midcourse phase intercepts are arguably the most challenging from a detection and tracking perspective, as the missile is at the peak of its trajectory, and having shed booster stages is a small and cool radar target. Kinematically, midcourse phase intercepts are demanding in terms of altitude, even if the missile’s speed is modest as it flies across the top of the ballistic arc. This phase can last as long as 20 minutes, allowing several opportunities to destroy the incoming ballistic missile outside the earth’s atmosphere. Any debris remaining after the intercept will burn up as it enters the atmosphere.
The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System provides Combatant Commanders the capability to engage and destroy limited intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile threats in space to protect the nations.
Terminal Phase
The terminal phase is very short and begins once the missile reenters the atmosphere. It is the last opportunity to make an intercept before the warhead reaches its target. Intercepting a warhead during this phase is difficult and the least desirable of the phases because there is little margin for error and the intercept will occur close to the intended target. The principal tracking challenge is discrimination between the re-entry vehicle and debris or countermeasures re-entering concurrently. The latter proved a major issue for Patriot intercepts of the Scud in 1991. Kinematics then become the primary challenge for a defender’s missiles.
Terminal phase interceptor elements include the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) now with the US Army, the Aegis BMD near-term Sea-Based Terminal Defense capability using the SM-2 Block IV missile, and the US Army’s PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) now deployed worldwide. These mobile systems defend against short- to medium-range missiles.
Anti-ballistic systems
There are only two systems in the world that can intercept ICBMs. Besides them, many smaller systems exist (tactical ABMs), that generally cannot intercept intercontinental strategic missiles, even if within range—an incoming ICBM simply moves too fast for these systems.
Russian A-135 anti-ballistic missile system
The development of the Russian A-35 anti-ballistic missile system, used for the defense of Moscow, started in 1971. Russia has been developing a missile defense shield for several decades to secure strategic military balance with the US. The A-135 anti-ballistic missile system is currently deployed around Moscow. It comprises dozens of interceptor missiles and sophisticated early warning radars.
The system, operated by the Air and Missile Defense Command of the Russian Air Force, is compliant with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty from which the US unilaterally withdrew in 2002. America keeps developing its own systems, including in Eastern Europe, where NATO is building Aegis Ashore ground-based missile defense sites.
The NATO bloc’s missile defense compound in Deveselu, Romania, became operational in May this year. Poland plans to obtain a similar base within two years. Washington insists the Aegis Ashore systems are for “defensive purpose only,” arguing they would help protect European allies from Iran or North Korea’s missile threats.
PAC-3 Missile used by the US Army
The PAC-3 Missile is a high velocity interceptor that defeats incoming targets by direct, body-to-body impact. PAC-3 Missiles, when deployed in a Patriot battery, significantly increase the Patriot system’s firepower, since 16 PAC-3s load-out on a Patriot launcher, compared with four Patriot PAC-2 missiles. One hundred percent effective in Operation Iraqi Freedom, PAC-3 Missiles are now deployed with US forces.
Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, Dallas, Texas, is the prime contractor on the PAC-3 Missile Segment upgrade to the Patriot air defense system. The PAC-3 Missile Segment upgrade consists of the PAC-3 Missile, a highly agile hit-to-kill interceptor, the PAC-3 Missile canisters (in four packs), a fire solution computer and an Enhanced Launcher Electronics System (ELES). These elements are integrated into the Patriot system, a high to medium altitude, long-range air defense missile system providing air defense of ground combat forces and high-value assets.
The PAC-3 Missile uses a solid propellant rocket motor, aerodynamic controls, attitude control motors (ACMs) and inertial guidance to navigate. It was selected by the US as the primary interceptor for the multi-national MEADS.
The United States has missile defense cooperative programmes with a number of allies, including the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Israel, Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, Czech Republic, Poland, Italy, and many others. The Missile Defense Agency also actively participates in NATO activities to maximise opportunities to develop an integrated NATO ballistic missile defense capability.
India’s newly launched BMD
The test of Ashwin missile which took placed recently, part of Indian Ballistic Missile Defence Programme, is part of a concentrated effort to develop a two-tiered missile defence system by India to counter the threat emanating from neighbouring countries’ strategic missile force.
India seeks to deploy a functional ‘iron dome’ ballistic missile defence (BMD), incorporating both low-altitude and high-altitude interceptor missiles.
Two interceptor missiles, the Prithivi air defence missile and the Advanced Air Defence (Ashwin) missile are designed to provide a high-low cover against incoming ballistic missiles. Prithivi is reported to be capable of intercepting missiles at exo-atmospheric altitudes of 50 – 80km, while the AAD is designed to operate at endo-atmospheric altitudes of up to 30kms.
The development makes India the fourth country in the world, to have successfully developed a ballistic missile defence system.
Prompted by a growing arms race in the region, of both delivery systems and nuclear warheads, India has embarked upon and given priority to creating a BMD, which will also augment India’s overall air defence capabilities.
The recent test conducted of the interceptor missile was a success, and an important technological milestone was achieved. But a single successful test in controlled conditions does not imply that the system would retain the same level of effectiveness in combat conditions.
A BMD, although effective against a small number of incoming missiles, can be overwhelmed by employing saturation fire. If an opposing force were to shoot multiples missiles in an area of operation, a BMD battery can track and shoot down some missiles, but not all.
Conclusion
Throughout the years of the Cold War, the US relied significantly on nuclear weapons to deter hostile threats. While the end of the Cold War signalled a reduction in the likelihood of global nuclear conflict, one of the greatest threats facing the world today remains the increasing proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
The increasing technology transfer and missile proliferation could render traditional deterrence and diplomacy ineffective against a future missile attack and this increases the significance of ABM and ICBM defense.
Reference Photo: http://www.mda.mil,http://www.ausairpower.net
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