Military and Strategic Journal
Issued by the Directorate of Morale Guidance at the General Command of the Armed Forces
United Arab Emirates
Founded in August 1971

2023-01-01

Deterrence a Key Factor in U.S. Strategy on Nuclear Weapons

A stated policy of restraint is what shapes the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy. The U.S. says it is committed to taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons as well as the risks of nuclear war, while ensuring its strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective, and extended deterrence commitments remain strong and credible.
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has substantially reduced the size and diversity of its nuclear forces, narrowed the circumstances under which it would consider employing these forces, actively sought reciprocal force reductions with Russia, and made progress in global non-proliferation and risk reduction.
 
NPR Affirmation
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) affirms the following roles for nuclear weapons: Deter strategic attacks; assure Allies and partners; and achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails.
These roles are interrelated, complementary and provide the basis for developing and assessing the country’s nuclear strategies, policies, and capabilities. 
 
“Hedging against an uncertain future” is no longer a stated role for nuclear weapons. The U.S. has hinted it will continue to carry out robust risk management strategies within the nuclear enterprise so that it is capable of delivering credible deterrence even in the face of uncertainties and unanticipated challenges. 
This requires sustaining a set of initiatives and actions in the nuclear enterprise that over time builds enduring advantage and resilience in its stockpile, production complex, and science and technology efforts.
 
Strategic Attacks
The U.S. affirms that its nuclear forces deter all forms of strategic attack. They serve to deter nuclear employment of any scale directed against the U.S. homeland or the territory of Allies and partners, whether on the ground, in the air, at sea, or in space. Any adversary use of nuclear weapons, regardless of location or yield, would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict, create the potential for uncontrolled escalation, and have strategic effects.
 
Consistent with prior reviews, the U.S. nuclear strategy accounts for existing and emerging non-nuclear threats with potential strategic effect for which nuclear weapons are necessary to deter. The policy makers consider that nuclear weapons are required to deter not only nuclear attack, but also a narrow range of other high consequence, strategic-level attacks.
 
Assuring Allies
Extended nuclear deterrence contributes to non-proliferation goals by giving Allies and partners confidence that they can resist strategic threats and remain secure without acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. Part of U.S. assurance to Allies and partners is a continued and strengthened commitment to arms control, nuclear non-proliferation, and nuclear risk reduction to improve collective security by reducing or constraining adversary capabilities.
 
As part of NPR implementation, the U.S. will update nuclear weapons employment guidance in accordance with the policy and strategy established by the President following publication of this report. The U.S. nuclear weapons employment guidance is approved by the President, and all nuclear plans are reviewed and approved by the Secretary of Defence. 
These plans are prepared with advice from the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, among other senior officials. Legal advice is integral to the preparation of these documents and includes review of their consistency with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), which is authoritatively stated for Department of Defense (DoD) personnel in the DoD Law of War Manual. 
 
Integrated Deterrence
The U.S. looks to deter through safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces that enable country-specific strategies and plans, extended deterrence commitments, and an integrated deterrence approach that incorporates suitable non-nuclear capabilities tailored to specific threat scenarios. 
 
This approach requires modernising nuclear forces, NC3, production infrastructure, and science and technology and industrial base; strengthening extended deterrence relationships; and reinforcing the nuclear forces with defences against adversaries’ conventional, cyber, space, information, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities.
 
A key goal of integrated deterrence is to develop tailored options that shape adversary perceptions of benefits and costs. The role of nuclear weapons is well established and embedded in strategic deterrence policy and plans. 
Non-nuclear capabilities may be able to complement nuclear forces in strategic deterrence plans and operations in ways that are suited to their attributes and consistent with policy on how they are to be employed. 
 
A pragmatic approach to integrated deterrence will seek to determine how the Joint Force can combine nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in complementary ways that leverage the unique attributes of a multi-domain set of forces to enable a range of deterrence options backstopped by a credible nuclear deterrent. 
 
Important Element
Another important element of integrated deterrence is better synchronising nuclear and non-nuclear planning, exercises, and operations. 
In U.S. view, the range of nuclear options available to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) leadership will expand in the years ahead, allowing it potentially to adopt a broader range of strategies to achieve its objectives, to include nuclear coercion and limited nuclear first use. 
Washington is expected to maintain a flexible deterrence strategy and force posture that continues to convey to the PRC that the U.S. will not be deterred from defending its Allies and partners, or coerced into terminating a conflict on unacceptable terms. 
 
Forces that provide this flexibility include the W76-2 low yield submarine launched ballistic missile warhead, globally-deployable bombers, dual-capable fighter aircraft, and air-launched cruise missiles. 
 
Russia remains the U.S. rival with the most capable and diverse nuclear forces. Today it is unique in the combination of strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces it fields that enables nuclear employment ranging from large-scale attacks on the homeland to limited strikes in support of a regional military campaign. 
 
To deter large-scale attacks, the U.S. will field a modern, resilient nuclear Triad. To deter theatre attacks and nuclear coercion of Allies and partners, Washington will bolster the Triad with capabilities that further strengthen regional deterrence, such as F-35A dual-capable fighter aircraft (DCA) equipped with the B61-12 bomb; the W76-2 warhead; and the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon. 
The PRC and Russia are at different stages in their nuclear weapons development but each is seen as posing a major and growing nuclear threat to the U.S. and its Allies and partners. 
 
Washington’s strategy for North Korea recognises the threat posed by its nuclear, chemical, missile, and conventional capabilities, and the need to make clear to the Kim regime the dire consequences should it use nuclear weapons. Any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable.
 
New Capabilities
Changes in the security environment and new capabilities — particularly in the cyber and space domains — will contribute in crisis or conflict to an increasingly complex operating environment. In this type of environment, deterring aggression and managing escalation will be more challenging. Accordingly, in developing and executing tailored deterrence strategies, Washington will follow guidelines for managing escalation risk. 
 
These guidelines will reflect general principles and approaches that favour crisis stability, such as architectural resilience and defences that reduce first mover advantages in cyber and space; operational concepts and capabilities that provide options intended to limit escalation risk; and resilient, stress-tested weapon systems and command and control networks.
The U.S. has substantial experience in strategic dialogue and crisis management with Russia, but has made little progress with the PRC despite consistent U.S. efforts. The world expects nuclear powers to act responsibly, including on risk reduction and crisis communications, and the U.S. will continue to pursue these efforts with China.
 
Day-to-Day Alert
U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are not on “hair trigger” alert. These forces are on day-to-day alert, a posture that contributes to strategic stability. Forces on day-to-day alert are subject to multiple layers of control, and the U.S. maintains rigorous procedural and technical safeguards to prevent misinformed, accidental, or unauthorised launch. 
 
Survivable and redundant sensors provide high confidence that potential attacks will be detected and characterised, enabling policies and procedures that ensure a deliberative process allowing the President sufficient time to gather information and consider courses of action. In the most plausible scenarios that concern policy leaders today, there would be time for full deliberation. 
 
For these reasons, while the U.S. maintains the capability to launch nuclear forces under conditions of an ongoing nuclear attack, it does not rely on a launch-under-attack policy to ensure a credible response. Rather, U.S. nuclear forces are postured to withstand an initial attack. In all cases, the U.S. will maintain a human “in the loop” for all actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the President to initiate and terminate nuclear weapon employment.
 
As long as Allies and partners face nuclear threats, extended nuclear deterrence will remain a pillar of regional security architectures. Effective assurance of Allies and partners is built on a shared view of the security environment and deterrence challenges; a commitment to risk- and burden-sharing; modern and effective nuclear forces; robust consultation processes; and Ally and partner confidence that the United States has the will and capability to meet its security commitments. 
 
As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. A strong, cohesive Alliance with a clear nuclear mission remains essential to deter aggression and promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, and the central role nuclear weapons and other strategic capabilities play in Russian doctrine. 
U.S. strategic nuclear forces and forward-deployed nuclear weapons provide an essential political and military link between Europe and North America. 
 
Non-Proliferation
Beyond the critical role played by deterrence, arms control, risk reduction, and nuclear non-proliferation play indispensable roles in reducing nuclear dangers. These are mutually reinforcing tools for preserving stability, deterring aggression and escalation, and avoiding arms racing and nuclear war. Washington is placing renewed emphasis on arms control, nuclear non-proliferation, and risk reduction. These policies complement U.S. nuclear policy and force structure decisions and enable it to pursue opportunities to reduce the role of nuclear weapons globally, enhance strategic stability with the PRC and Russia, and reduce the risks of war or escalation during war. 
 
Limitations on and greater transparency into adversary nuclear and possibly non-nuclear strategic capabilities through arms control is central to any approach to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. Mutual, verifiable nuclear arms control offers the most effective, durable and responsible path to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. strategy and prevent their use. 
Upon taking office in January 2021, the U.S. President immediately extended the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) for the full five-years provided in the Treaty. Extending verifiable limits on Russian intercontinental-range nuclear forces contributes to strategic stability and advances defence priorities. 
 
Successfully enforcing future arms control agreements will require new technical capabilities for verification and monitoring (V&M). The U.S. is already investing in some of the needed technologies, but additional resource prioritisation may be required to ensure they will be available when needed. Washington’s participation in several international collaborations (e.g., International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification) advances the technical basis for innovation in V&M. 
 
The U.S. says it remains dedicated to preserving and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and reaffirms its commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT has made the world safer and more prosperous, and all Parties, including the United States and its Allies and partners, continue to benefit from the Treaty. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its nuclear safeguards system, including the Additional Protocol, as well as effective international export controls, impede nuclear proliferation and should be strengthened. 
 
P5 Process
The P5 Process promotes dialogue on nuclear issues that could build confidence and understanding, enhance transparency, and create a forum for high-level engagement. Future efforts could be tailored to deepen engagement on nuclear doctrines, concepts for strategic risk reduction, and nuclear arms control verification.
 
The U.S. supports the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and is committed to working to achieve its entry into force, recognising the significant challenges that lie ahead in reaching this goal. In the near term, it continues to support the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organisation; the completion and provisional operation of the International Monitoring System and International Data Centre; and development of the on-site inspection regime so that it will be capable of carrying out its compliance verification mission once the Treaty enters into force. 
 
Once in force, the CTBT would ban nuclear explosive tests of any yield. Under the CTBT there is no threshold of nuclear yield below which nuclear explosive tests are permissible. If the CTBT were to enter into force, Russia and the PRC would have an obligation to comply with the Treaty’s “zero-yield” standard. 
 
A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and remains a key element of the global non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. The U.S. continues to support the commencement of FMCT negotiations, provided they are governed by consensus and all key states participate. 
The U.S. does not consider the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) to be an effective means to reach that goal. The U.S. does not share the underlying assumption of the TPNW that the elimination of nuclear weapons can be achieved irrespective of the prevailing international security environment. 
 
Nuclear Counter-terrorism
Preventing an act of nuclear terrorism is an enduring national security requirement. The U.S. plans to continue to work through diplomacy and partnerships to advance the core elements of its nuclear counterterrorism strategy: denying non-state actors access to nuclear materials and related technology; improving forensic capabilities to identify the origin of nuclear material outside of regulatory control or used in a nuclear device; monitoring and disrupting terrorist attempts to obtain nuclear capabilities; and, maintaining an incident response posture to detect, interdict, and defeat nuclear threats or minimise the consequence of nuclear events.
 
Modernisation Plan
The U.S. will field and maintain strategic nuclear delivery systems and deployed weapons in compliance with New START Treaty central limits as long as the Treaty remains in force. Programmes are also being executed to modernise U.S. DCA, the nuclear weapons stockpile, the NC3 architecture, and the weapons production infrastructure. 
 
While the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure, and effective, most nuclear deterrent systems are operating beyond their original design life. Replacement programmes are on track, but there is little or no margin between the end of effective life of existing systems and the fielding of their replacements. These replacement programmes are planned to deliver modernised capabilities. The B83-1 gravity bomb will be retired due to increasing limitations on its capabilities and rising maintenance costs. 
 
A safe, secure, and effective deterrent requires modern weapons and a modern infrastructure, enabled by a world-class workforce equipped with modern tools. The nuclear security enterprise must be able to respond in a timely way to threat developments and technology opportunities, maintain effectiveness over time, and at all times ensure that Presidential guidance can be achieved.
 
This plan has three pillars. First, given the complexity and interconnected nature of ongoing nuclear modernisation and sustainment programmes, DoD and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will improve coordination and integration. DoD and NNSA will develop and implement a Nuclear Deterrent Risk Management Strategy to identify, prioritise, and recommend actions across the portfolio of nuclear programmes and monitor the overall health of the nuclear deterrent.
 
Second, NNSA will institute a Production-based Resilience Program (PRP) to complement the science-based stewardship programme and ensure that the nuclear security enterprise is capable of full-scope production. The PRP will establish the capabilities and infrastructure that can efficiently produce weapons required in the near-term and beyond, and that are sufficiently resilient to adapt to additional or new requirements should geopolitical or technology developments warrant. 
 
Key attributes are flexibility, supply chain security and resilience, production capacity margin, and elimination of single point failures. 
Third, NNSA will establish a Science and Technology Innovation Initiative to accelerate the integration of science and technology (S&T) throughout its activities. This initiative will add to the existing science portfolio an increased focus on leveraging S&T to support the weapon design and production phases and modernise the production complex. The goal is to more rapidly assimilate findings from academic, commercial, and internal research and  reduce the time and cost required to design and produce weapons with the most modern technologies that are most responsive to potential threats. 
 
This initiative will include new and replacement science facilities. Additionally, NNSA will partner closely with DoD’s S&T community as both pursue activities to foster and exercise the national technology base.
 
Safety Commitment
In an increasingly complex security environment, Washington says it is committed to ensuring a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, and strong and credible extended deterrence — a posture that contributes to stability and supports the broader objectives of the U.S. National Defence Strategy. 
 
This includes a commitment to responsible stewardship of nuclear weapons, constructive collaboration with Allies and partners, pragmatic approaches to arms control and non-proliferation, and responsible technology innovation that enhances stability.
 
Reference Text: National Defense Strategy 2022
Pic credit: www.af.mil
 
 

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